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What is the best way to deliver various goods and services in the advanced complex 
economy? What is the appropriate division of labor among the state, the private for-
profit, and the nonprofit sectors? This essay explores these questions relative to the well-
being of consumers, and offers a set of broad answers grounded in the analysis of the 
relations between different types of organization and their consumers, and the internal 
organization of these types of organization. Around the turn of the twenty-first century, 
economic activity was divided among the for-profit, state, and nonprofit sectors in a few 
large advanced economies in these ways: for-profit firms employed the vast majority of 
workers in the economy, from almost two-thirds in France to about three-quarters in 
Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States; government organizations 
(enterprises and agencies) at various levels employed as little as 15% of workers in the 
US to as much as almost one-third in France; whereas nonprofit organizations employed 
as little as 5% in France and Germany to nearly 9% in the US. The shares of the three 




The experience of developed market economies like France, Germany, UK, and US 
illustrates that both government organizations and for-profit firms can produce and 
deliver just about any good or service, including ammunitions, airplanes, cars, building 
products, banking and other financial services, insurance, sports clubs, water, electricity, 
postal services, internet, arts and culture, medical services, research, prisons, public 
                                                 
1 Sources: World Bank, World Development Indicators, and OECD National Accounts. The role of the 
state in the allocation of resources is greater that these figures suggest because of the state’s ability to raise 
revenues from taxes, then to allocate them for production of goods and services in all three sectors, and 
because of the exercise of its regulatory functions. In the middle of the 1990s, government spending in 
France was about 46% of GDP, in Germany 44%, in the UK 36%, and in US, 20%. 
 
  2toilets, public transportation, mail, military services, shelter for the homeless, and many 
others. The nonprofit sector has been carrying out a narrower set of activities; yet, the 
nonprofit form of organization is being enlisted to do increasingly more. 
 
The past two decades were a time of great changes, with enormous technological 
advances and much economic, social, political, demographic, and organizational change. 
This is a good time to ask questions of the role of the three sectors in the complex, 
diverse, and ever-changing economy. Why do multiple types of organization coexist in 
the same economy, sometimes side by side in the same industry? The answer that I offer 
in this essay is that different types of organization have different advantages and 
disadvantages, and that the balance of advantages and disadvantages depends on factors 
that vary across industries and countries.  
 
Adam Smith’s famous statement that "[i]t is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the 
brewer, or the baker that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own 
interest" is central to neoclassical economics. A key theorem of economics is that in a 
competitive market, firms that seek to maximize profits will meet the interests of 
consumers as closely as economically feasible. This theorem holds in a perfectly 
competitive market because, in their search for profit, firms must attract customers with 
low prices, high quality, and good customer service, not because they care about 
customers as such, but because customers will patronize firms that satisfy them best. 
Firms that seek to take advantage of consumers in a perfectly competitive market will 
lose customers and will go bankrupt. Under such circumstances, a firm that seeks to 
maximize consumer well-being cannot do better for consumers than a for-profit firm will. 
 
However, there are many departures from the conditions that make provision by for-
profit firms optimal for consumers, including imperfect competition, asymmetric 
information, public goods, externalities, and situations where the identity of the 
interacting parties matters to them. This essay examines the circumstances that lead to 
violations of the conditions for optimal provision by for-profit firms, relative to the 
criterion of maximum consumer well-being, and investigates key corrections in the form 
  3of government regulation and provision, as well as provision by nonprofit organizations.
 2 
Such violations, small and large, are ubiquitous in the modern economy. The reason that 
correctives are not as pervasive as they should be is because they are not costless. The 
costs associated with the establishing and running government and nonprofit 
organizations stem from problems with governance, muted efficiency of operation, and 
difficulties raising capital, which frequently put them at a disadvantage relative to for-
profit firms. Employing a cost-benefit analysis, I suggest a tentative allocation of 
economic activity across the three sectors for different goods and services. 
 
There are many issues connected to the question of distribution of economic activity, 
including income redistribution, social welfare and social insurance, the pursuit of 
macroeconomic policies through government employment and spending, the political 
power attendant to economic power, employment and work issues, and so on.
3 However, 
the scope of this essay is restricted to just one question:  What is the optimal distribution 




The paper is organized as follows. The next section examines violations by for-profit 
firms of conditions for optimum provision relative to consumer well-being; this is a fairly 
                                                 
2 The analysis and examples offered in this essay concern the final consumer, primarily individuals. 
However, the analytical framework is applicable to buyers generally, including firms as purchasers of 
inputs from other firms, in which case the corrective measures include also contracting, vertical integration, 
and outsourcing. A key difference between consumers and firms is the ability of the latter to enter into 
complex contractual arrangements that involve understanding, observation, and enforcement of matters that 
are beyond the ability of an individual. The choices of such buyers also bear on the distribution of 
economic activity (e.g., whether government and nonprofit organizations carry out their own cleaning 
services or purchase them from for-profit firms, or government supplies its own needs or procures goods 
and services from for-profit firms). See Hart, Shleifer and Vishny (1997), Ben-Ner (in press), and Singer 
(2003) for examinations of such issues. 
3 The analytical framework applied to the examination of the relationship between firms and consumers is 
also applicable to the investigation of the relationship between firms and workers (see Ben-Ner 1988, and 
Ben-Ner and Jun, 1996). Dreze and Hagen (1978) establish the equivalence between the two types of 
analyses (firm-consumer and firm-worker relationships) in a general model. 
4 The paper does not address the question of how economic activity came to be divided in different 
countries, except to observe that history has big footprints and long shadows. To understand how things 
came to be the way they are one would need an analysis that combines de Tocqueville and Braudel. 
Weisbrod (1988) and Hansmann (1998) provide broad overviews of the mixed economy, emphasizing the 
role of the nonprofit sector. 
 
  4rudimentary analysis of market failures. Section III investigates government and 
nonprofit correctives to for-profit failures. Section IV compares the efficiency of the 
three types of firms, focusing on issues of governance, agency problems, and access to 
capital. The final section compares the advantages and disadvantages of the for-profit 
firms, government regulation and government organizations, and nonprofit organizations 
and proposes an allocation of economic activities across the three sectors for a number of 
industries.  
 
II. When Do For-Profit Firms Fail to Operate in the Best Interest of Consumers? 
 
In a perfectly competitive market, for-profit firms operate in a manner that maximizes 
consumers’ well-being. Several related conditions must be met for perfect competition: 
  
1.  (no market power) there are sufficiently many sellers and buyers operating in the 
market, or are ready to enter it, so that none has market power, 
2.  (information) sellers and buyers are fully informed about the relevant 
characteristics of the product,  
3.  (rivalry) consumption is rival,  
4.  (excludability) consumers can be easily charged for their consumption,  
5.  (anonymity) the identities of the transacting parties do not matter to them, and 
6.  (no externalities) the actions of the seller or its products cause harm or benefit to 
those who do not use the product. 
 
In this section I examine the circumstances when each of these conditions for optimality 
is met or violated and the consequences for consumers of possible violations. 
 
No market power. Firms may acquire power in the market and hinder competition in 
several ways. An important case is that of natural monopoly, which arises when there are 
large unrecoverable investments in capacity to serve a specific group of customers, 
leading to economies of scale, such as with the distribution of electricity and water. 
Monopolies or restricted competition may also stem from government restrictions or 
  5licensing, collusion among firms to prevent new entry, small market size, and aspects of 
products discussed later in this section. Cost and demand conditions may allow only a 
small number of firms to survive in a particular market, but if entry is easy, fast, and 
relatively inexpensive, then the market may still be quite competitive.
5
 
The consequences of violations of the “no market power” condition include higher prices, 
lower quality, less reliable products, and generally more restricted and less dynamic 
markets – all adverse consequences for consumer well-being. 
 
Information. Symmetry of information about a product exists when both seller and 
customers have free access to the same information about product characteristics. 
Frequently, sellers know more than their customers about the durability of a 
manufactured good, the curative value of a medical drug or treatment, the precise 
ingredients or the nutritional content of a food item, the growing method of crops, the 
way young children or aged parents are cared for in an institution, how funds donated for 
improving the living conditions of the poor are actually spent, how donations to an arts 
museum are precisely used, and so on. Asymmetric information affords the seller the 
opportunity to take advantage of the relative ignorance of the consumer to enhance 
profits by misrepresenting the product as something better and more useful that it actually 
is. For example, faults of used cars are hidden by some sellers, some physicians and 
hospitals order unnecessary medical procedures,
6 vegetable oil is sometimes 
surreptitiously added to chocolate and butter, elderly people may be treated poorly in 
nursing homes, and so on, all because consumers (or their sponsors in the case of the very 
young, the infirm, or the voiceless) cannot tell exactly what they are paying for.
7  
                                                 
5 This is the essence of the theory of contestable markets (Baumol, Panzar and Willig, 1982). 
6 See, for example, Kurt Eichenwald, “How One Hospital Benefited on Questionable Operations: Operating 
Profits – Surgery Needed or Not?” The New York Times, p. 1, August 12, 2003. The article alleges that 
doctors at a for-profit hospital conducted unnecessary heart surgeries in order to boost profits (“They were 
pushing for what I thought was ridiculous financial results,” said a former administrator). 
7 This is the condition that was studied under the rubric of asymmetric information by Stiglitz (1974), 
Akerlof (1970), and many other economists (predominantly in the context of principal-agent relations in the 
workplace, and corporate finance). One of Akerlof’s examples concerns used cars, whose sellers have an 
incentive to hide defects and misrepresent the quality of their cars. Buyers know about such incentives and 
about bad experiences in purchases of used cars, and therefore suspect, although have no way of 
confirming or refuting all their suspicions, that cars offered to them are less good than how sellers represent 
  6 
Whereas it is in the interest of every firm to take advantage of the privileged information 
it has about its product, it is also profitable for every firm to be recognized as an honest 
seller of reliable products. Therefore, firms seek to establish a reputation for being sellers 
of products of reliable quality, so that when a product is advertised to have certain 
characteristics, customers’ post-purchase experience shows that indeed those 
characteristics are present. The reputation mechanism works well in a stable 
environment, where firms are known and their past behavior is public knowledge. 
Provision of product warranties is another strategy that firms pursue in order to earn 
consumer trust. However, residual mistrust often remains, especially in competitive 
markets, where entry and exit of firms is easy, and therefore reputations and warranties 
are not that valuable.
8
 
It is also in the collective interest of firms to ensure the viability of markets for products 
affected by significant asymmetric information, essentially to prevent a situation in which 
‘bad money’ drives out ‘good money.’ They establish voluntarily industry associations 
and lobby for governmental regulations that ensure standards and can impose various 
sanctions against violators.  
 
The provision of faulty products is a cause of private litigation. This mechanism 
undoubtedly reduces the incentives firms have to act on asymmetric information, when 
courts impose penalties and reparations that make it less profitable to supply faulty 
products. But private litigation is expensive, causal relationships are difficult to prove in 
courts, the court system and tort laws are not specialized enough in the numerous areas of 
potential litigation, and overall it seems that the threat of litigation does not contribute 
                                                                                                                                                 
them. As a result, buyers are willing to pay only lower prices, penalizing sellers of better cars as well as 
honest sellers, to the effect that such cars may be partially withdrawn from the used cars market. Blumberg 
(1989) relates numerous anecdotes about exploitation of asymmetric information by firms (including in the 
used-car market); the anecdotes were collected from hundreds of students who wrote about their personal 
experiences as employees in various industries. See also Holmstrom and Milgrom (1994) for an analysis of 
the distorting effects of strong profit incentives on quality. 
8 The issue of trust in for-profit firms is complex, and many factors are involved in developing it. See Ben-
Ner and Putterman (2001, and in press). 




Rivalry. Car repair, medicines, a can of soda, medical treatment, and a seat on an 
airplane are examples of rival products, because the use by one consumer excludes the 
simultaneous use by another consumer. In contrast, air, water, national defense, and city 
parks are nonrival to a large degree. With rival goods, the seller receives a direct and 
clear signal about demand, and can react accordingly: if there is excess demand, increase 
production and/or price, and do the reverse if there is excess supply. At the equilibrium 
price, those who have greater demand than others will buy more, but the price will be 
uniform. Nonrivalry is a defining characteristic of public goods. 
 
The problem with nonrivalry is that everybody has to use the same product: everybody 
breathes the same air, and everybody enjoys the services of the same and only national 
military force, despite possible differences in demand. With rival goods, differences in 
demand are expressed through the purchase of different quantities: the total quantity of a 
rival good supplied on the market is the sum of individual demands. This cannot be done 
with nonrival goods, so instead of satisfying individual demands, supply is geared to the 
average consumer, but the price is uniform. As a result, at the prevailing price, those with 
low demand will regard it as too high, and those with high demand will feel that there is 
insufficient provision in terms of either quantity or quality of the nonrival good.
10
 
The problem can be solved by charging different prices and determining the quantity and 
quality of the product in view of the different demands. But how is the seller going to 
know what the different demands are, and how is it going to be able to charge different 
prices for the same good, that is, to institute price discrimination? Imagine the reaction to 
a for-profit firm’s plan to increase the quality of its product if only those who care about 
higher quality would pay a higher price – but of course will enjoy the same quality as 
                                                 
9 For reviews on the role of courts and litigation, see Glaeser and Shleifer (2003), and Polinsky and Shavell 
(2000). 
10 Of course, pure public goods like national defense are supplied by the state; a tax rate that would fund 
defense would be equivalent to the price of a private good, and the average or median dominant voter is 
equivalent to the average consumer. 
  8those who pay a lower price. High demanders will prefer to free ride – pay lower price 
and get the higher quality – thwarting the voluntary price discrimination scheme. 
 
Suppose that high demanders find a way to overcome this free-ridership problem, as it is 
in their interest to do, and are willing to pay higher prices in some form of donations to 
the for-profit firm. However, without access to information on the firm’s detailed 
accounts and operations, high-demand consumers have no guarantees that the firm will 
devote the additional revenue generated by the voluntary contributions to quality 
improvements instead of bolstering its profit. Consequently, they will refuse to 
participate in this scheme.
11 The alternative is to write contracts with individual 
consumers and donors, or with an organization that represents them, specifying the price, 
quality, quantity, and other characteristics of the product. Individual customers will in 
general be unable to engage in complex contract writing and enforcement. Large or 
organized consumers and donors could engage in such contracting, as is often the case 
between suppliers and purchasers (typically for-profit firms themselves) when price 
discrimination of the sort discussed here is mutually beneficial. 
 
This is the problem with nonrivalry, when it describes the entire product. A similar, less 
problematic but far more pervasive, issue arises when nonrivalry characterizes only some 
aspects of the product, such as its design, quality, color, and so on. The severity of 
violation of the rivalry condition increases with the importance of the nonrival aspect to 
the cost of production of the product and to consumers’ demand for the product.
12 The 
extent of the nonrivalry and the market failure associated with it vary inversely with the 
size of the market, and positively with the heterogeneity of demand. For automobiles, 
there is a very large market, so that the cost of the design is relatively small compared to 
the number of units and their individual cost, whereas a local theater’s cost of production 
                                                 
11 In the US, for-profit firms get practically no donations, and very few volunteers as compared to nonprofit 
organizations and government (511,000, 6,357,000 and 2,426,000 respectively, in 1998; see Table 1.6, The 
New Nonprofit Almanac and Desk Reference, Independent Sector and Urban Institute, Jossey-Bass, 2002); 
nearly all volunteers in for-profit firms are in hospitals and old people’s homes.  
12 The relative importance is measured in terms of the cost of the design, the number of units produced on 
its basis, and their marginal cost (the smaller the number of units and the lower the unit cost relative to the 
cost of the mold, the greater the nonrivalry problem), and the importance of the design, quality, or color to 
consumers’ demand for the product. 
  9is relatively high relative to the number of times the production is presented and the cost 
of each show; the severity of the nonrivalry problem is therefore greater for local theater 
than for automobiles. Parents of young children who have to use the same child-care 
center and have strong and differing views about the center’s educational philosophy and 
techniques will be dissatisfied. Such issues are unlikely to arise in the context of less 
important matters, such as the color of the walls. Other examples of products with 
significant nonrivalry aspects include movies that are expensive to produce, medicinal 
drugs that require large research and development expenses, TV, museums, and parks. 
 
The problem with nonrivalry increases with the heterogeneity of consumers’ demand; if 
all consumers were identical, there would be no problem with nonrivalry. But even with 
demand heterogeneity, the size of the market may eliminate potential problems because 
for-profit firms can produce sufficient diversity and avoid a situation in which consumers 
are forced to buy the same model of car, watch the same movies, walk in the same park, 
have children in the same day care center, visit the same museum, and so on. 
 
Excludability. The possibility of controlling access to a product and charging for its use 
is critical to the ability of a firm to cover its costs of production. There are few 
completely nonexcludable products; air and national defense are perhaps the best 
examples. For the condition for optimal provision to consumers to hold, excludability 
should be costless. The problem with nonexcludability is that products, or aspects of 
products, that are nonexcludable, will be provided at a sub-optimal level. Examples 
include the nonrival aspects of products, since they cannot be unbundled and sold 
separately. Nonexcludability is a matter of degree: even ordinary goods are not costlessly 
excludable because they need to be kept under lock and guard. Products that were once 
nonexcludable, such as TV signals, are now excludable through encryption. Just as 
nonexcludable products can be made excludable, excludable products like library 
services may be made nonexcludable in order to ensure free or inexpensive access. In 
principle, such access could be achieved through subsidies from government or private 
donors to for-profit firms, but as noted earlier, this is unlikely to happen because of the 
  10fear that for-profit firms would use the money to increase profit more than to increase 
service. 
 
Anonymity. For a product to be traded competitively, different units must be considered 
equivalent and must bear the same price, irrespective of the identities of the transacting 
parties. The more important personal relationships are (on the basis of various sources of 
identity such ethnicity, religion, culture, place of origin, etc.), the greater the departure 
from competition.
13 Furthermore, if continuity is the basis for the formation of social 
capital, a for-profit firm may be able to take advantage of the sunk costs made by the 
parties because it would be costly to recreate them elsewhere (Hansmann, 1985). In a 
similar vein, when a service is valued for the degree of affect that is involved in its 
delivery, for-profit firms will not be fully trusted or valued because consumers will think 
that the affect is motivated by financial gain (Gui, 2000).  
 
No externalities. The production and consumption of a product may have unintended 
effects on parties that are not direct consumers of the product. The problem is that 
externalities are not paid for; they are a special case of products with nonexcludable 
aspects. For example, a positive externality is produced when well-educated children 
behave well in public. A negative externality is generated when a factory pollutes the air, 
when stressful working conditions contribute to poor driving, or when physicians 
prescribe antibiotics excessively and strengthen bacteria’s resistance to drugs. This 
condition, albeit important, has fewer implications for the relationship between a seller 
and its consumers than the previous conditions. 
 
In conclusion, under certain circumstances the pursuit of profits conflicts with consumer 
interests and leads to the failure of for-profit firms to maximize consumer well-being. 
Table 1 describes generally the degree to which each of the optimality conditions is 
violated. The degree of violation depends primarily on the product, but other 
contingencies have an effect too. Some of these contingencies concern the ability of 
                                                 
13 Ben-Ner, Stephane, and Wang (2003) show experimentally that various bases for identity have 
significant effects on economic behavior. 
  11consumers to inform themselves about products (the information condition will be 
violated less severely in the case of more informed and educated consumers), the size of 
the market (the no market-power, rivalry, and excludability conditions will be more 
easily met in a large city than in a small town), the heterogeneity of a population (the 
more diverse the demand is, the more likely it is that the rivalry, excludability, and 
anonymity conditions will be violated), the transparency of social relations (the 
information condition will be violated less if for-profit firm owners are part of the 
community), the strength of ethnic and religious identity (contribution to violations of the 
identity condition), and much more. Therefore, the degree of violation noted in Table 1 is 
not only a function of a product’s characteristics, but also of other contingencies. The 
entries in the table reflect an exercise in identifying issues that may arise in the 
production and delivery of various goods and services in common but unspecified 
circumstances. For instance, in the case of bottled water, there is a competitive market 
with many competitors selling close substitutes and there is easy entry, but there exists 
considerable asymmetric information about the content and composition of the water, and 
because the existences of a few well-known brands there is a strong reputation effect; 
bottled water is rival, is excludable, the identity (as such) of the interacting parties does 
not matter much, and there are few externalities. Despite profound similarities, bottled 
and tap water are different with respect to issue of organizational form best suited for 
their delivery. The distribution system of tap water entails much more important 
economies of scale, hence monopolistic tendencies, than in the case of bottled water; 
asymmetric information is not too severe, because one test suffices for many distribution 
points; it is fully rival, and is nonexcludable only to the extent that society regards access 
to drinking water as a right; it is an impersonal product, and there are a few externalities 
(primarily those associated with water tables and such, but not much in consumption).  
 
Electricity distribution can be analyzed in a similar fashion to tap water. Current 
technologies of electricity production permit relatively easy transmission from multiple 
points and alternative sources, so there is scope to some competition; there is no 
asymmetric information problem, electricity is fully rival and excludable; externalities 
seem to be the main problem. Contemporary automobile production is carried out with 
  12technologies that permit the creation of relatively (to the size of the global market) 
inexpensive molds, so the market is competitive and the nonrivalry problem minimal; the 
main problem is with externalities in production. For another example, consider prisons. 
The demand for the product comes from the public (or the authority in charge of prisons), 
not the incarcerated prisoners. From the public’s point of view there is no competition, it 
is very difficult to know what is going on inside a prison, the facility and treatment are 
the same for all prisoners in a particular prison, and hence there is considerable 
nonrivalry. The product is rival, and identity and externalities seem to play a limited role 
only. 
 
A more detailed justification of this table, including specification of the circumstances 
that bear on the degree to which each of the optimality conditions is violated for each 
example is beyond the scope of this paper; the purpose of the table is to provide germinal 
ideas to stimulate the reader to evaluate the extent to which for-profit firms satisfy the 
demand of different consumers in diverse industries and circumstances. 
 
III. Government and Nonprofit Correctives and Substitutes for For-profit Failures 
 
The foregoing analysis has established that for-profit firms fail to maximize consumer 
well-being when circumstances allow them to take advantage of their customers in order 
to maximize their own profit. The present section examines what, if anything, can 
government and nonprofit organizations do to improve on for-profit firms’ performance 
with respect to each of the optimality conditions, ignoring for now the special costs of 
operating these organizations. 
  
a) Government 
The state (government in the broad sense) has many roles that do not bear directly on the 
question addressed in this essay. There are many kinds of government organizations, 
differing in their geographic scope, autonomy from higher levels of the state, and other 
dimensions. Regulation of economic activity and direct provision of goods and services 
are two governmental functions that are undertaken with at least a partial view towards 
  13improving consumer well-being, and I shall evaluate these functions only with respect to 
this question. I will reduce the complex and complicated institution of the state to an 
essential minimum, and will defer discussion of important issues, including the 
possibility of capture of government objectives by private interests, until later.
14
 
The state’s regulatory role 
Governments can regulate the price, quantity, and quality of products sold by for-profit 
firms, as well as the inputs required for production. In principle, regulators could affect 
all markets to operate optimally. The large number of violations and their geographical 
distribution would require that regulators be active throughout the economy, from the 
goods producing industries to diverse services delivered in numerous establishments and 
localities. To a certain degree, this does take place in the complex contemporary 
economy. Regulators study, inspect, oversee, enforce, penalize, and litigate firms in a 
vast swath of the economy, from ensuring that the foundations of new buildings are 
sound, that trains are safe, that restaurants are clean, that child care center teachers are 
licensed, that cars are safe, that gas pumps are accurate, that theaters have fire exits, that 
medicinal drugs do what their manufacturers claim, and so on. 
 
Regulation does not affect the for-profit firm’s objectives, and usually affects their 
incentives only through the threat of fines and penalties. Regulation works through the 
acquisition of information (continuously, periodically, or through random sampling such 
as unscheduled inspections of meat-packing plants) to set price, quantity, and quality 
standards. Regulators face a severe problem of asymmetric information relative to the 
regulated. For example, to control market power, regulators need to know almost 
everything that concerns cost and production in the regulated firms. To deal with the 
information condition, regulators must not only know what firms actually do, but also 
why they do that, and how else they could operate. Regarding nonrivalry and 
nonexcludability, government regulators could facilitate donations by certifying their use, 
and so on. To carry out the regulatory function effectively requires a daunting amount of 
                                                 
14 A detailed analysis of the role of government in the provision of nonexcludable and nonrival goods can 
be found in Kaul (2003). 
  14information, a large number of expert regulators to gather and analyze the information, as 
well as a cadre of regulators’ counterparts in for-profit firms. This limits considerably the 
effectiveness of the regulatory function of government to place a role in every instance of 
need for it. 
 
Government provision 
In comparison, government organizations could provide directly products that for-profit 
firms fail to provide optimally, and could improve consumer well-being less expensively 
than through regulation – all it would take is to direct government organizations to 
operate to maximize consumer well-being. This simple direct-control mechanism works 
well in the case of some optimality conditions, but not so in others.  
 
Government organizations should be able to refrain from using market power and be able 
to emulate the competitive outcome.
15 Directives to avoid the exploitation of asymmetric 
information against the interests of consumers and to internalize externalities are 
conceptually easy to draft and to follow.  
 
The case of products affected by nonexcludability offers a natural scope for government 
provision, with government organizations being funded by compulsory taxes. However, 
there is no market mechanism that can signal true demand when the effective price is set 
to zero. Of course, the public knows that national defense, for example, is not free, but 
the voting mechanism does not permit the selection of a tax price and a defense quantity 
and quality schedule according to which choices can be made. Voting for political 
candidates whose views bundle many issues is far from approximating such a schedule. 
Consequently, the outcome through the political mechanism is likely to leave many 
consumers (voters) unsatisfied, although the outcome may improve upon lack of 
provision of the nonexcludable product altogether.
16 The closer the correlation among the 
various issues on different parties’ agendas and the closer the relationship between 
                                                 
15 Montias, Ben-Ner and Neuberger (1994) discuss this issue in connection with Oskar Lange’s principles 
for running government-owned firms. 
16 Nonexcludable goods may have excludable partial substitutes: private militias may take the place of 
national armies, private guards may substitute for police, and private book collections may replace public 
libraries. A complete comparison should include these alternatives.  
  15income and demand for nonexcludable products, the more satisfying is government 
provision.
17 Finally, the smaller the differences in demand, the easier it is to provide the 
products in response to the public’s demand. 
 
Government provision of nonrival products requires the ability to charge different prices 
for the same product, which can be accomplished with differential tax rates if the 
conditions just discussed hold, which is not very likely. Government organizations’ 
ability to obtain donations is quite restricted, not necessarily because of distrust on the 
part of consumers that government will appropriate profits instead of improving service, 
but because of the general reluctance to support government beyond compulsory taxation. 
Where the size of the market permits, government organizations could supply different 
products to different demand groups, as for-profit firms do with their products, such as 
cars, restaurants, and so on. However, this runs counter a strong sense (that is sometimes 




Similar reasons lead to the suggestion that government organizations are not likely to be 
able to provide optimal levels of products that are linked to identity. However, the 
absence of the profit motive and the desire to assist the public may make government 
organizations better providers of products with a significant relational component than 
for-profit firms. 
 
b) Nonprofit organizations  
The ability of nonprofit organizations to minimize or avoid violations of the six 
optimality conditions and to improve for-profit provision depends on how they are 
constituted. Nonprofit organizations seek to provide products for the benefit of at least 
some, if not all, of their customers rather than to generate maximum profits for their 
shareholders. Some nonprofit organizations serve a defined group of members; these 
                                                 
17 This assumes that the income tax is progressive. 
18 For example, the government in the Netherlands supports financially the provision of products such as 
education, arts, and media to diverse ethnic and cultural groups, not through its own organizations but 
through nonprofit organizations. 
  16members may be the owners of the organization and thus entitled to profits generated by 
the organization, and formally govern the organization. These nonprofit organizations are 
called consumer cooperatives, membership organizations, and clubs. In addition to 
members, cooperatives may serve customers who are not their members. Other nonprofit 
organizations serve deserving people who often are not able to pay full price on the 
market, and are supported by individual donors or organizations (including the state). 
Such organizations, often termed charities, are run by donor representatives or by social 
entrepreneurs and boards of directors selected by them, and use all profit to enhance the 
product. A third type of nonprofit organization represents a hybrid of the previous two, 
and has a mix of revenues from sales and donations. Such organizations include many 
hospitals, theater, universities, and so on.
19 In the US, charities and hybrid nonprofit 
organizations are prohibited from distributing profits and are required to invest all 
surplus; this restriction does not apply to cooperatives, and is less common in other 
countries, regardless of the specific type of nonprofit organization. 
 
In general, nonprofit organizations have little or no incentives to exercise market power 
against the interests of their customers. The primary reason is that they operate for the 
benefit of consumers; when they are formally prohibited from distributing profits, they 
reinvest profits in the organization.
20 However, cooperatives and hybrid nonprofit 
organizations may use market power against non-members or consumers who are not in 
their target group, in order to benefit their members and core consumers.
21
 
Similar considerations apply to the information condition. Nonprofit organizations have 
generally no incentive to exploit asymmetric information. They are expressly interested 
                                                 
19 This is a very coarse way of classifying nonprofit organizations, but is sufficient for the purposes of this 
essay. The legal classification of the universe of nonprofit organizations in the US is described in Ben-Ner 
and Van Hoomissen (1993), Figures 1 and 2; for Europe, see Ehlermann (1992), and various papers in 
Borzaga and Defourny (2001). 
20 In fact, many consumer cooperatives, mutual financial institutions, agricultural purchasing cooperatives, 
and the like were formed to fight the negative consequences of limited local competition in the provision of 
groceries, power generation, and so on. 
21 For example, cooperative grocery stores may sell products to their members at lower prices, as well as 
distribute to members profits from non-members.  
  17in the well-being of their customers and may elicit customer trust and custom.
22 
However, in some nonprofit organizations management may prefer to use profit 
generated by exploitation of some consumers’ insufficient information in order to support 
other activities or other consumers. This can be done with rival products, where different 
consumers can receive different qualities of the product (such as the reliability of car 
repair), but not with nonrival products (such as the curriculum in a school, care in a child 
care center, or produce available in a grocery store).  
 
Concerning nonrivalry and nonexcludability, nonprofit organizations may be able to 
provide a safe and trustworthy place where customers can reveal their desires (demand) 
for the product and make donations to ensure that the product (day care for their children, 
aid to the poor in distant locations, interesting theater productions) is made available in 
the way they desire. Through their input in the decision-making of their organizations, 
customers and donors can enforce proper use of their information and donations. 
 
Nonprofit organizations enjoy a clear advantage in the provision of products that entail 
the affective involvement of the parties and whose value depends on the identity of those 
who participate in consumption. This is the case with many cooperatives, membership 
organizations, cultural groups, and other settings where it matters who is participating in 
the organization, and where the product is partly the interaction itself.  
 
Nonprofit organizations’ attitude towards externalities depends on how the externalities 
affect their customer or membership base. A regional electric power cooperative is more 
likely than a for-profit firm or a state enterprise to consider the consequences of pollution 
associated with the location of their plant and the equipment they use. Similarly, a local 
nonprofit organization is more likely to consider the effects of its location on the 
                                                 
22 Arrow (1963) was the first to suggest that asymmetric information may give rise to the nonprofit form of 
organization, when he examined the trust patients need to have in their health-care givers, and concluded 
that the profit motive may get in the way of trustworthy care. Hansmann (1980) made the first 
comprehensive statement of the protection that the legal constraint against distribution of profit in nonprofit 
organizations lends to consumers and how this earns their trust in these organizations. Ortmann and 
Schlesinger (2003), Bacchiega and Borzaga (2003) and others (myself included) consider this constraint to 
be a minor source of the trustworthiness that nonprofit organizations may enjoy (consumer control being 
the main source). See Hansmann (2003) for a rebuttal.  
  18neighborhood than a for-profit firm, or a nonprofit organization with a national scope 
would. 
 
IV. Governance, Agency, and Access to Capital in Government and Nonprofit 
Organizations Relative to For-profit Firms  
 
Table 2 summarizes the foregoing discussion of the comparative performance of 
government and nonprofit organizations relative to for-profit firms that violate the 
consumer well-being optimality conditions. Nonprofits and government dominate the for-
profit firm with regard to catering to the objectives of consumers. But simply put, the 
desire to do well for consumers is not worth much if the organization is inefficient and 
resources are wasted. In this section, I examine efficiency conditions that relate to 
governance, agency problems, and access to capital.  
 
The first condition is that owners or controllers can agree among themselves what the 
organizational objectives should be, and are able to formulate and communicate their 
objectives to management. The second condition for efficiency is to bring management to 
comply with these objectives. Third, management has to enlist the efforts of employees 
towards the pursuit of these objectives. Fourth, owners must be able to marshal resources 
necessary for production, including financial capital. There are distinct differences among 
for-profit, government, and nonprofit organizations in the ways and the extent to which 
they can meet these conditions.
23
 
For-profit firms’ owners are typically interested in profit, with only an instrumental 
concern for the products of their firms. (This is, of course, the source of the violations of 
the optimality conditions examined in section II). The objective of profit maximization is 
clear and easy to communicate to management, and there is a simple metric to measure it. 
However, owners can rarely observe management’s efforts, and when they do, they often 
cannot judge the merits of these efforts, which are quite specialized. This gives rise to an 
                                                 
23 A discussion of these issues in the three types of organization can be found in Ben-Ner, Montias, and 
Neuberger (1993). 
  19agency problem, whereby management can pursue its financial and other objectives at the 
expense of owners. To ameliorate the problem, owners seek to align management’s 
interests with their own by offering them ownership shares, profit sharing, and other 
incentives linked to firm profit and share value. The difficulty in controlling management 
increases with the size of the company and the complexity of its operations, as well as 
with the number of owners, because they tend to free-ride on the supervision efforts of 
each other.
24 But owners are not alone in exercising control over management. Outsiders 
who believe that a company is not managed well may see an opportunity for gain by 
purchasing it and disciplining or replacing existing management; the threat alone has 
disciplining effects. Failed managers are likely to see their job opportunities curtailed. 
Additionally, in competitive markets, a firm will not be able to raise prices above the 
market, and if it provides poor returns to shareholders, they will abandon it and starve it 
for capital. A well-managed and profitable enterprise will be able to attract capital from 
investors. These various mechanisms tend to impose a considerable degree of discipline 
on management. Importantly, whether management pursues shareholders’ interests 
closely or those of its own, it will seek to run a firm efficiently, because efficient 
operation is consonant with both types of objectives. 
 
In contrast to for-profit firms, government organizations do not have clearly defined 
owners.
25 Government organizations are owned by, or belong to, the citizens of the 
jurisdiction in which they are chartered. The meaning of citizen ownership of government 
organizations is, of course, different from that of ownership of for-profit firms. In 
particular, it does not accord individuals the right to returns generated by government 
organizations, the right to control them, or the right to transfer their ownership shares. In 
a democracy, these rights are exercised by elected officials who delegate them to 
management of individual organizations (enterprises, bureaus, agencies) through a long 
chain of agency relations.  
 
                                                 
24 There are differences across countries in the way large companies are managed; for example, in some 
countries boards of directors are dominated by representatives of banks, organized labor, and other 
institutions, arrangements that reduce the free-ridership problem but introduce other issues. 
25 For a comprehensive analysis of the internal organization of government agencies, see Vickers and 
Yarrow (1988). 
  20A government organization, whether regulatory or provider of a product, is ordinarily not 
constituted to make profit but to attain other objectives, subject to a break-even 
constraint. A government organization has the difficult task of defining its concrete 
objectives as opposed to broad goals. It is the rare case where a government organization 
has a single quantifiable objective. A for-profit firm that runs a train service has to 
generate profit to its owners, whereas a government organization is charged to provide 
train service that is accessible, continuous, affordable, and safe (Héritier, 2002). The 
managerial problem is that there is no weighting scheme that will aggregate these 
objectives the way prices allow aggregation of profits from different activities. Thus, the 
first condition for organizational efficiency is generally very difficult to attain in 
government organizations. 
 
Meeting the second condition, of bringing management to pursue owners’ objectives, is a 
function of the difficulty with the first condition. Management has considerable leeway to 
pursue its own objectives, or those of parties that are not the recognized or authorized 
‘owners.’ The problem is not necessarily graft, but with tilting the mission of the 
organization, for example towards the wishes of interest groups. The common remedy for 
agency problems in for-profit firms – connecting incentives to results – is difficult to 
institute when results are hard to pin down. Thus, government organizations must be run 
without the powerful financial incentives that for-profit firms have at their disposal. 
 
The span of attention of both the ultimate owners, the citizenry, and of their agents, the 
elected officials, is limited by the fact that they have many additional concerns competing 
for their time and energy. The existence of numerous government organizations leads to a 
large span of control, which in turn leads to the long chain of delegation referred to 
earlier. The combination of limited attention span and large control span exacerbates the 
agency problem at lower levels of government organizations, including in the relationship 
between management and employees. There are two twin problems at this level. First, 
managers have weaker incentives (as compared to their for-profit counterparts) to 
manage employees strictly. Second, managers are prevented from using certain types of 
incentives that are proffered to for-profit employees, such as profit sharing and other 
  21financial incentives tied to organizational performance. As a result, employee motivation 
will be weaker, and so will be performance.
26 The alternative to use external criteria to 
judge performance, particularly through benchmarking against similar organizations, is 
not available because government organizations often fill a specific niche by themselves. 
The competitive pressure of the market that forces discipline is unavailable for similar 
reasons. 
 
Finally, investment and access to capital are often determined outside the operating 
government organizations, and are less directly connected to results than in for-profit 
firms. This factor reduces the operational efficiency of government organizations. On the 
other hand, the ability of the government to issue bonds and to tax makes entry of new 
organizations easier. 
 
Nonprofit organizations face similar problems to government organizations on several 
levels, commencing with complex objectives, and the absence of financially motivated 
owners. In nonprofit organizations, like in many for-profit firms, a board of directors or 
trustees bears the authority to make key decisions. However, nonprofit boards are rarely 
as active or as influential as for-profit firm boards; nonprofit managers are probably less 
accountable to their boards than government managers are to their superiors. In 
cooperatives and member-controlled organizations, the situation is better, but even there, 
membership involvement, just like shareholder involvement, may not suffice to control 
management effectively. Unless an organization and its product are very important to its 
members, they are not likely to invest many resources in its control. Other mechanisms 
that control management in for-profit firms are not available in nonprofit organizations. 
Hence, management autonomy is probably greatest in nonprofit organizations, leading to 
                                                 
26 Government organizations tend to compensate for these problems by instituting a myriad of rules and 
regulations aimed at controlling employees’ behavior, leading to inflexibilities and other phenomena 
associated with bureaucracies. These tendencies are exacerbated by the need to protect government 
organizations from large swings in employment when politicians change, by granting employment 
protection to employees. 




Access to capital by nonprofit organizations is limited to member subscriptions, 
donations, and retained earnings. The mechanism on which for-profit firms rely, raising 
funds from investors, is not available to nonprofit organizations, as it would contravene 
the consumer orientation by seeking profit to reward investors. Overall, nonprofit 
organizations’ access to capital is less efficient than that of for-profit firms.
28
 
The analysis presented in this section suggests that, in general, government and nonprofit 
organizations encounter more hurdles to efficient operation than do for-profit firms. In 
other words, if all three types of organization were to produce the same product in the 
same environment, the for-profit form would be more productive than the other two 
forms and would therefore offer a lower price or higher quality. Various contingencies, 
including the size of communities, the educational attainment of consumers, the extent of 
the social capital, and more, affect the comparative degree of efficiency in government 
and nonprofit organizations. For example, communities that are more cohesive will be 
able to exercise better control over management of government and nonprofit 
organizations; the more diverse the population in a jurisdiction is the less likely it will be 
that government will provide separate services to all of them (leaving room for both for-
profit and nonprofit provision); ethnic groups interested in a set of services (including 
cultural activities, child care and elder care, etc.) will be able to control them better 
through a single control and oversight infrastructure than groups with disparate interests; 
and so on. Table 3 summarizes the comparative efficiency of government and nonprofit 
organizations relative to for-profit firms without reference to various contingencies, 
implicitly assuming some ‘common’ levels for them. 
                                                 
27 See Ben-Ner (1994), Manne (1999), and Birchall (2002) for analyses of the role of members and boards 
of directors in effective control over management. The problem with management in nonprofit 
organizations does not arise because ‘bad’ agents self-select into nonprofits; indeed, many authors consider 
nonprofit managers at least as committed to their organizations’ goals as are for-profit managers; see Badelt 
(2003), Young (2003), Bilodeau and Slivinski (1996), and Glaeser and Shleifer (2001). The more severe 
agency problem arises because of more lax control over management. 
28 See Steinberg (in press) for a discussion of issue of capital and investment in nonprofit organizations, and 
for references to the literature. 
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V. Benefits versus Costs: Comparing the Advantages and Disadvantages of For-
profit, Government and Nonprofit Organizations 
 
No type of organization enjoys superiority in its relationship with consumers and its 
internal efficiency. As Table 3 illustrates, for-profit firms are generally more efficient, 
but as Table 2 has shown, government and nonprofit organizations tend to treat 
consumers better. An organization’s net comparative advantage or disadvantage relative 
to other organizations depends on the characteristics of its product and other factors that 
determine how it fares on the consumer well-being optimality conditions, and on the 
attributes of its controllers and other factors that determine how if fares on the internal 
efficiency conditions. The answer to the question which products should be provided by 
for-profit firms, government, and nonprofit organizations or should be regulated depends 
therefore on a number of factors.  
 
Table 4 contains my recommendations for the allocation of roles to the three types of 
organization in provision and regulation of products in various industries. The table 
constitutes, in effect, combination of the conclusions of the analyses summarized in 
Tables 1, 2 and 3. Table 4 suggests that there often may be room for more than one type 
of organization in the provision and regulation of a particular product, because the 
contingencies that affect their desirability vary across consumers and communities.
29 To 
illustrate how the analysis underlying the entries in Table 4 may be carried out, consider 
the child care and education industries. In many communities these industries and their 
products are characterized by significant elements of market power, asymmetric 
information, nonrivalry, nonexcludability, and externalities, as well as the need for 
consideration of the identity of the children and teachers (Akerlof and Kranton, 2002). 
Provision by for-profit firms is therefore generally suboptimal relative to the well-being 
of consumers (students, their parents, or the organs of government sponsoring their care 
                                                 
29 In the table, regulation by nonprofit organizations refers to consumer organizations that evaluate goods 
and services (such as the Consumer Union in the US), and to the very common associations of for-profit 
firms that provide various degrees of non-binding regulation (such as Better Business Bureaus, and 
industry-based associations). 
 
  24and education). Therefore, government and nonprofit organizations should be the 
providers of choice unless they suffer from large efficiency disadvantages relative to for-
profit firms. Nonprofit educational organizations can be run efficiently when and where 
parents or other sponsors are involved in control over management, or if there is close 
supervision by an organization in which parents and community are involved. 
Government provision is often preferred to nonprofit organizations because of the desire 
to insure free access and avoid a difficulties associated with subsidization of students,
30 
and the desire to imbue students with common rather than sectarian values.
31 In contrast, 
vocational training often lacks many of these elements, and is therefore appropriately 
provided by for-profit firms. 
 
As the table reveals, I do not find much reason for government provision of goods. The 
large size of the market for goods reduces problems with provision by for-profit firms 
associated with the first five conditions (in Table 2), and judicious regulation should 
suffice to deal with the sixth, externalities. Consequently, the cost of government 
organizations’ operational inefficiencies may outweigh the benefits of government 
provision. Why is there no need for nonprofit organizations in the provision of goods? 
Generally, when consumers organize to protect or advance their self-interest, they need to 
be close to the product. Because the market for goods is large, the organizing consumers 
will constitute only a small minority among all consumers, so the benefits of their actions 
will be dissipated over a large number of consumers, whereas they will have to bear all 
the costs. 
 
Some services, like garbage collection, financial services, and certain forms of training 
are provided by for-profit firms under circumstances that are similar to goods, and with 
similar violations of optimality conditions. When there are more severe violations, 
government intervention or nonprofit provision is called for. Many services are provided 
under circumstances that vary greatly across communities; violations of optimality 
conditions vary with these circumstances, as does the ability to operate organizations 
                                                 
30 See Hart, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) for a discussion of vouchers in for-profit schools. 
31 James (1993) argues that the desire to inculcate religious values that are not imparted in public schools 
explains the size of the nonprofit education sector in various countries. 
  25more or less efficiently. Hence there will be organizational variation across communities 
in the provision of services like those listed in Table 4. 
 
The three types of organization examined in this essay have advantages and 
disadvantages that are related to their very nature, and are bundled together. 
Nevertheless, neither advantages nor disadvantages are immutable, and policies can be 
developed to ameliorate weaknesses and enhance strengths in all three forms of 
organization. For example, partnerships across organizations from different sectors make 
it possible to build on the strengths of the partners (Hanss, 2001, Minow, 2003, and 
Sandmo, 2003); education of managers to understand the unique disadvantages faced by 
government and nonprofit organizations improves management of these organizations 
and their ability to operate efficiently (Steinberg, in press); development of institutions 
that support pro-social values limits violations of optimality in provision by for-profit 
firms (Ben-Ner and Putterman, 1998); establishment of support organizations that 
facilitate decision-making in nonprofit organizations improves their efficiency (Young, in 
press); encouragement of access to information increases transparency and accountability 
and strengthens the ability of all types of organization to provide their products 
efficiently; and enactment of legislation and regulations adapted to the needs of each type 
of organization has an important function in advancing their effectiveness and efficiency. 
Such policies can foster a more efficient distribution of economic activity across the three 
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Key:  Little or no violation
Moderate violation
Substantial violation
ConditionsTable 2: How Government and Nonprofit Organizations Perform in 












No Market Power +++
Information +++
Rivarly o/+ o/+ +
Excludability o/+ + o/+
Anonymity/Identity o o/+ +
No Externalities +++
Note: + means improvement over provision by for-profit firms 
             0 means comparable provision to for-profit firms Table 3: Governance, Agency, and Access to Capital in Government and 
Nonprofit Organizations Relative to For-Profit Firms
















Access to Capital o ~/o ~
Note: ~ means lower efficiency than in for-profit firms 





Bottled water P1 R1 R2 Key: 
Tap water P2 P1 P3
Electricity distribution P3 P1 P3
Electricity production P1 P2, R1 P3
Automobile production P1, R2 R1 0
Air transport P1, R2 R1 0
Railroads P1, R2 P2, R1 0
Culture and arts P3 P2 P1
Entertainment (mass) P1 0 P2
National defense 0P 10
Public safety 0P 1 P 2
Home security P1, R1 R2 0
Prisons 0P 10
Telecom P1 R1 P3, R2
Post & delivery P1 P2, R1 0
Social insurance 0P 10
Medical insurance P2 P1, R1 P3
Physician care P1 P2, R2 P3
Hospital care P1 P1, R1 P1
Medical drugs P1, R3 R1 R2
Garbagge collection P1 R1 P2
Research - basic P3 P2 P1
Research - applied P1 P2 P3
Financial services P1, R3 R1 P2, R2
Libraries P3 P1 P2
Child care centers P3 R1, P2 P1, R2
Elementary education 0 P1, R1 P2
Higher education P3 P2 P1
Vocational training P1 P3 P2
Advocacy and lobbying P3 0 P1
Ethnic clubs P3 0 P1
Participant sports clubs P3 P2 P1




1 = Primary role
2 = Secondary role
3 = Tertiary role
0 = No involvement